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INTRODUCTION

The time to reform Minnesota’s criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”)
laws is now. 1 Conceptions of sex, rape, and consent have evolved from
paternalistic ideals and given way to modern reforms and an ever-expanding
understanding of sexual relationships. One need only watch cringeworthy
interactions of sex symbols of earlier decades to understand how drastic this
shift has been. For example, take what was an entirely acceptable scene in
the PG-rated, 1964 film Goldfinger. 2 James Bond corners his female coNate Summers is a recent graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of Law and
current law clerk for the Honorable Judge Diane Bratvold. The opinions expressed here are
his own, with considerable thanks to Professor Mark Osler of St. Thomas and Christina
Warren and James Hanneman of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, for their
thoughtful guidance in composing this article and ceaseless service to the community.
See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341–.3451 (2019).
GOLDFINGER (EON Productions 1964).
ǂ

1
2

2

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

star, Pussy Galore, in a stable and makes several sexual advances, which
Galore rejects. 3 He then attacks Galore, who pushes him away. 4 Finally,
Bond pins Galore to the ground and kisses her. 5 Galore continues to resist
Bond, but eventually, Galore gives in, and the scene cuts away. 6 Galore later
changes allegiances and helps Bond defeat his nemesis, Auric Goldfinger. 7
The essential takeaway from this scene and the movie overall is clear: if not
for Bond’s ability to overpower Galore’s initial lack of consent, Goldfinger
would have been successful in his plan to destroy Fort Knox. 8
Recently, investigative journalists have exposed gaping holes in how
Minnesota’s law enforcement agencies handle sexual assaults. 9 These
realizations prompted many reforms, including the use of trauma-informed
interviewing techniques by investigators in cases of sexual assaults, 10 and led
to the repeal of some distasteful and outdated laws. 11 However, the
Minnesota Legislature’s work is not done.
While Minnesota defines consent in modern terms, 12 the
definition’s interplay with the CSC statutes entirely misses the mark when it
comes to the criminality of nonconsensual sexual conduct. Remnants of
outdated rape statutes remain in the current CSC statutory framework,
which requires either force or injury to elevate an offense to a felony. 13
Today in Minnesota, the law makes no distinction between nonconsensual
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Brandon Stahl, Jennifer Bjorhus & MaryJo Webster, When Rape Is Reported and
Nothing Happens, STAR TRIB. (July 22, 2018) [hereinafter Stahl et al., When Rape Is
Reported], https://www.startribune.com/when-rape-is-reported-in-minnesota-and-nothing3
4
5
6
7
8
9

happens-denied-justice-special-report-part-one/487130861/
[https://perma.cc/W7BQ3PP7].
See Abby Honold Act, S. 171, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Dana Ferguson, Minnesota
peace officers to adopt ‘victim-centered’ approach to sexual assault investigation, BRAINERD
DISPATCH (July 25, 2019), https://www.brainerddispatch.com/news/government-andpolitics/4038212-Minnesota-peace-officers-to-adopt-victim-centered-approach-to-sexualassault-investigation [https://perma.cc/3G83-CHXQ] (detailing newly-adopted training
requirements for police officers to support trauma-informed and victim-centered approaches
to sexual assault investigations).
See, e.g., Act of May 30, 2019, ch. 5, art. 4, § 9, 2019 Minn. Laws 43 (removing the
“buttocks exception” to Fifth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, which originally excluded
the “intentional touching of the clothing covering” the area of the buttocks from prosecution);
MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (2018) (repealed 2019) (providing a voluntary relationship defense
for criminal sexual conduct crimes).
See MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4 (2019).
See id. § 609.3451 (indicating nonconsensual sexual contact is generally a gross
misdemeanor).
10
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sexual intercourse without force or injury and intentional, nonconsensual
touching of a victim’s inner thigh. 14
The Legislature would be wise to adopt an affirmative consent
standard into its CSC statutes, as it would accurately reflect the criminality
of nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse. The Legislature need not
look far for a working model of affirmative consent: Wisconsin has a
relatively long history of using the affirmative consent standard to
criminalize nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse, even without
force or injury. 15 Given recent controversy regarding Minnesota’s CSC
statutes, 16 the Legislature should adopt a version of Wisconsin’s sexual
assault statutes to bring Minnesota’s statutes in line with modern
conceptions of sex, rape, and consent.

A.

The Problem

Joanna Howe’s Lyft driver sexually assaulted her after he walked
her to her apartment. 17 Howe had been drinking earlier that night—her last
memory was of a man standing over her as she lay naked on her bed. 18 Police
collected bedding and clothing from her room, and Howe underwent a
sexual assault exam, but the results were inconclusive. 19 Eventually, police
were able to make contact with the suspect, and he admitted that Howe
“seemed drunk, but . . . coherent.” 20 He also admitted to staying at Howe’s
apartment “for an ‘hour or so. We cuddled, and we had . . . both ways.’” 21
The case was referred to the Ramsey County Attorney’s Office in
August 2017, but the office declined charges. 22 The prosecutor told Howe
that “because [the suspect] texted that she was coherent and that she walked
up to the apartment with him, it would be reasonable for a jury to believe
that she was not physically helpless,” as defined under Minnesota law. 23 The
suspect’s behavior was “absolutely outrageous,” Ramsey County Attorney
John Choi said in an interview, “but from a prosecutor’s standpoint, there’s
a question as to whether it violates the law.” 24 From Howe’s standpoint,
14

See id. (defining fifth degree criminal sexual conduct).

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 2020).
Stahl et al., When Rape Is Reported, supra note 9; Ferguson, supra note 10.
Brandon Stahl, Jennifer Bjorhus & MaryJo Webster, How Alcohol Foils Rape
Investigations, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Stahl et al., How Alcohol Foils Rape
Investigations],
https://www.startribune.com/how-alcohol-foils-rape-investigations-inminnesota-denied-justice-part-three/488413421/ [https://perma.cc/RV49-774G].
See id. (containing Joanna Howe’s description of her sexual assault).
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id.
Id. (ellipsis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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however, “[t]here’s no way I could consent . . . . But because of the narrow
way that laws have been interpreted in Minnesota in cases like mine, I won’t
see any justice.” 25
On June 15, 2019, the St. Paul Police Department received a report
of a sexual assault from a 911 caller. 26 The caller stated that his friend “seems
to be sexually assaulted and is not okay[.]” 27 The caller continued, “[s]he left
with a couple of guys and she is absolutely bawling her eyes out and doesn’t
know what happened.” 28 The victim went to a hospital, obtained treatment,
and forensic evidence, including DNA, was collected. 29 Two suspects were
arrested and held, but charges were not filed, pending further investigation. 30
In a December 20, 2019 press conference, Hennepin County
Attorney Mike Freeman announced that charges would not be filed in the
case. 31 This decision was made despite the appropriate interviewing
techniques and prompt investigation Minnesota’s more recent reforms
require. 32 Freeman noted with frustration that “given Minnesota’s current
laws regarding intoxication and a victim’s ability to give consent, we were
working under some significant constraints.” 33 While he would not say
whether charges would have been filed had Minnesota’s laws reflected those
in Wisconsin, he did ask the Minnesota Legislature to “seriously consider
making changes to the criminal sexual conduct statute” during the 2020
session. 34

B.

Outline

This article seeks to provide context and analysis to the debate over
affirmative consent and proposes the Minnesota Legislature adopt language
that would absorb the affirmative consent standard into Minnesota’s CSC
statutes. To this end, Part II discusses the origin of Minnesota’s current
statutory scheme and describes the evolution of common law and
Minnesota’s rape statutes from a patriarchic property-type crime to the
25
26

Id.
No charges in University of Minnesota wrestling sexual assault investigation, FOX 9 (Dec.

20, 2019), https://www.fox9.com/news/no-charges-in-university-of-minnesota-wrestlingsexual-assault-investigation [https://perma.cc/RD4T-6RFQ] (detailing the investigation and
decision not to pursue charges in a student-involved sexual assault case).
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.

Hennepin Attorney, No Charges Filed Against University of Minnesota Wrestlers,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sor6uVMHt4o,
[https://perma.cc/C77N-PVYR]; see also No charges in University of Minnesota wrestling
sexual assault investigation, supra note 26.
Hennepin Attorney, supra note 30.
30

31
32
33
34

Id.
Id.
Id.
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complicated statutory scheme we have today. In Part III, this article will
discuss affirmative consent and show how, at least by its statutory definition,
Minnesota has already adopted a form of affirmative consent, though
affirmative consent is not represented in the broader CSC statutory
structure. Part IV discusses arguments against affirmative consent and their
counterarguments. Finally, in Parts V and VI, this article argues for a
complete rehaul of Minnesota’s CSC statutes, with a focus on reforming
what is currently defined in third-degree and fourth-degree CSC to cover
sexual intercourse and contact without affirmative consent, and to generally
simplify the CSC statutes. Proposed model language for the amended laws
is provided as a guide for the Minnesota Legislature in Part VI.
II. A HISTORY OF PAST REFORMS OF MINNESOTA CRIMINAL SEXUAL
CONDUCT LAWS
Minnesota’s CSC statutes represent a complicated amalgamation of
prohibited conduct. What began as a property offense against a victim’s
husband or father has evolved steadily through the years to cover some
forms of nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse. 35 The laws have
grown overly complicated as more and varied conduct has been proscribed,
though even these reforms miss the crux of what constitutes rape in modern
society: sexual conduct without consent. To better understand the
Minnesota CSC statutes today, one must first understand the history behind
the state’s current statutes.

A.

First Rape Statutes and Early Reforms

In the early years of statehood, Minnesota statutes did not
specifically define rape; however, statutes did allow for punishment of rape
based on its common law definition. 36 However, this common law definition
was highly prejudicial to victims and considered rape to be a property
crime. 37 The crime was based more on the supposed economic harm to a
victim’s father or husband than the harm to the rape victim, and the
punishment for rape had more to do with repaying the father or husband
Compare MINN. STAT., ch. 89, § 38 (1858) (repealed 1891) (“If any person shall ravish,
and carnally know any female of the age of ten years or more, by force and against her will,
he shall be punished by imprisonment in the territorial prison, not more than thirty years,
nor less than ten years; but if the female on trial shall be proven to have been at the time of
the offense, a common prostitute, he may be imprisoned not more than one year.”), with
MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2019).
See State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 164, 170 (1866) (“Our statutes do not create or define rape . .
. . Yet such crimes are recognized and punished by statute . . . .”); see also MINN. STAT., ch.
89, § 38 (1858) (repealed 1891).
See State in Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (1992) (“[R]ape had its legal origins
in laws designed to protect the property rights of men to their wives and daughters.”).
35

36

37
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for his supposed loss than censuring the offender or obtaining justice for the
victim. 38
Early common law generally defined rape as “the carnal knowledge
of a woman forcibly and against her will.” 39 The common law definition was
essentially codified in Minnesota’s first Territorial Statute of 1851. 40 This
definition, however, was highly problematic.
First, the use of gendered terms meant the outright denial that a
male could be a rape victim—a flawed norm that persisted well into the late
20th century. 41 In the rare case that sexual assault against a male was
investigated and prosecuted, it was not recognized as a sexual assault but
instead fell under the general assault statute. 42 Thus, if successfully
prosecuted, the assailant would receive a considerably lesser penalty than if
he or she had been convicted of rape. 43
Second, the force requirement meant a victim had to issue “the
utmost” resistance for the force element to be met. 44 Courts held that “[n]ot
only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there
must be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty
within the woman's power to resist the penetration of her person, and this
must be shown to persist until the offense is consummated.” 45 Thus, the
See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22: 28–29 (New Int’l Version) (“If a man happens to meet a virgin
who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay her
father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the young woman, for he has violated her. He
can never divorce her as long as he lives.”).
Rape, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Compare MINN. STAT., ch. 92a., § 6523 (1894) (repealed 1967) (“Rape is an act of sexual
intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, committed against her will or
without her consent.”), with Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1960) (“The common
law crime of rape is composed of three essential elements: carnal knowledge, force, and the
commission of the act without the consent or against the will of the female victim.”).
See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.291–.292 (repealed 1975); see State v. Witt, 310 Minn.
211, 217, 245 N.W.2d 612, 616–17 (1976) (noting that the gendered language of nowrepealed Minnesota Statute section 609.291–.292 showed the Minnesota Legislature made
a “factual determination that the rape of women by men is a significant social problem,
involving unique and potentially severe physiological, psychological, and social injuries and
traumas, and that other forms of sexual penetration, including a woman forcing sexual
intercourse upon a man, are much less serious social problems because they occur extremely
infrequently or because the harms they inflict are less grave, or because of both of these
factors.”) (internal citation omitted).
See generally Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crimestatistics-to-expand-rape-definition.html [https://perma.cc/65GT-U2H7] (detailing the
history of terminology in criminal sexual conduct cases that excluded types of assault that
victimized men).
See MINN. STAT., ch. 100, § 45 (1851) (repealed 1858) (setting a maximum of 3 years and
a minimum 6 months in prison for assault with intent).
Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 541 (Wis. 1906).
Id. at 538.
38

39
40

41

42

43

44
45
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victim’s actions were put on trial. Victims could not simply state that they
resisted their assaulters, they had to “relate the very acts done [to resist], in
order that the jury and the court may judge whether any were omitted.” 46
Victims were expected to “interpose most effective obstacles by means of
hands and limbs and pelvic muscles,” 47 without which even guilty verdicts
would be overturned.
Because of the force and resistance requirements, common law
shifted the focus of rape trials away from the defendant and onto the victim
in ways otherwise unheard of in criminal law. 48 Judges and juries questioned
whether a rape victim resisted their assailant and whether that resistance was
enough to constitute a rape. 49 According to early courts, “[m]ere verbal
unwillingness does not amount to want of consent, and may amount to
invitation.” 50 Thus, in order for the force element to be met, courts looked
at “the circumstances of each case, such as the time, place, and character of
the assault, and the age, intelligence, courage, and temperament of the
female.” 51 Clearly, the latter elements of the victim’s intelligence, courage,
and temperament subjected victims to substantial personal examination.
After that examination, “whatever the circumstances may be, there must be
the greatest effort of which she is capable therein to foil the pursuer and
preserve the sanctity of her person” for a rape conviction to stand. 52 This
element, flawed as it is, remains present in most of Minnesota’s current CSC
statutes. 53
Finally, the common law definition completely excluded the
possibility of marital rape—a standard which continued in Minnesota until
2019. 54 This definition reflected the patriarchal nature of marital and sexual
relationships. When a woman married her husband, she gave up the ability
to withdraw consent to sexual intercourse—all the law required in terms of

Id.
Id.
See Daphne Edwards, Acquaintance Rape & the “Force” Element: When “No” Is Not
Enough, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 241, 251 (1996) (“The element of lack of consent

46
47
48

and resistance had enabled courts to focus attention solely on the propriety of the victim's
behavior.”).
49

Id.

State v. Cowing, 99 Minn. 123, 126, 108 N.W. 851, 852 (1906).
State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 14, 136 N.W. 258, 259 (1912).
Cowing, 99 Minn. at 129, 108 N.W. at 853 (quoting People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 383
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1874)).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (2019). The force and coercion
requirements harken back to the days where a showing of resistance was necessary, requiring
the perpetrator to exhibit characteristics necessary to overcome resistance. Id.
Id. § 609.349 (2018), repealed by Act of May 2, 2019, ch. 16, § 1, 2019 Minn. Laws 1
(removing the voluntary relationship defense in criminal sexual conduct cases.).
50
51
52

53

54
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her consent was “I do” at the marriage ceremony. 55 From that point onward,
consent was assumed in terms of marital sexual intercourse, even if force or
injury were involved. 56
In the late nineteenth century, the Minnesota Legislature defined
the crime of rape and established several principles that would survive until
today, including the first use of consent in the statutes. 57 The Legislature
defined rape as sexual intercourse with a female who is not the wife of the
perpetrator against her will or without her consent. 58 The definition made
sexual intercourse with a female under the age of ten illegal, so long as the
female was not the perpetrator’s wife, and outlined five circumstances under
which a female victim could be raped. 59
First, a victim could be incapable of consent if she had what was
called an “idiocy, imbecility, or any unsoundness of mind.” 60 This definition
allowed the protection of the mentally ill and covered both temporary and
permanent mental illnesses. 61 Next, the statute codified the resistance
requirement, requiring that a victim either have “her resistance forcibly
overcome” 62 or show that “her resistance is prevented by fear of immediate
and great bodily harm which she has reasonable cause to believe will be
inflicted upon her.” 63 The statute also allowed the resistance requirement to
be met when a victim’s “resistance is prevented by stupor or by weakness of
mind, produced by an intoxicating narcotic or anesthetic agent,” though the
intoxicant had to be administered by the defendant or with his knowledge. 64
Finally, the statute prohibited sexual intercourse with an unconscious victim,
so long as the defendant knew the victim was unconscious. 65
This definition statutorily enshrined many of the common law
problems discussed above and simultaneously laid the groundwork for a
modern CSC statutory framework. First, the statute codified the common
See id. (“A person does not commit criminal sexual conduct . . . if the actor and
complainant were adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at the time
of the alleged offense, or if the complainant is the actor’s legal spouse . . . .”); see also Jill
Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1373, 1396–98 (2000).
See MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (2018) (repealed 2019). Presumably, a forward-thinking
prosecutor could charge the husband with assault in the same way she could charge the
assailant of a male victim, though the likelihood of a jury returning a guilty verdict would be
slim.
See id. § 6191 (1891) (amended 1967).
55

56

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
See id.; see also id. § 6192.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 1.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 4.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 2.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 3.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 4.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 5.
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law doctrine that a married woman cannot be raped by her husband. 66 It
also cemented the gendered terms, which ignored the possibility of rape
perpetrated against a non-female. 67 The statute also failed to criminalize
sexual conduct not amounting to intercourse, thus without “any sexual
penetration, however slight,” the crime could not occur. 68 Most importantly,
the statute codified the above-mentioned force requirement. 69 If a victim was
not mentally impaired, intoxicated, or unconscious, she was required to
resist “to the utmost” in order to meet the force element. 70
However, the statute did take several positive steps toward
recognizing the importance of consent and the criminality of a lack of
consent. Subdivisions 1, 4, and 5 of the statute prohibited sexual intercourse
with a person who is incapable of giving consent, whether due to mental
condition, intoxicant, or unconsciousness. 71 These subdivisions recognized
that, in some situations, consent and resistance are not possible and created
a method of prosecuting rape without inquiry into the victim’s resistance. 72
Additionally, in subdivision 3, the statute recognized that fear of bodily harm
could cause a victim to be unable to resist. 73 While the statute required the
fear to be of immediate and great bodily harm, it did provide another
avenue for prosecution. 74 However, the victim would still be subjected to
scrutiny by the judge or jury, as fear was required to be “reasonable” in their
eyes. 75
These statutes were re-codified as sections 617.01 and 617.02 of
the Minnesota Statutes in 1941 and remained unchanged for decades. 76
Then, in 1967, the Minnesota Legislature divided rape into two
classifications: rape and aggravated rape. 77 Aggravated rape absorbed much
of 1891’s earlier definition. 78 Aggravated rape was defined as sexual
intercourse with a female who is not the perpetrator’s wife, without consent,

Id. § 6191 (defining rape as “an act of sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator.”).

66

67
68
69

Id.
Id. § 6194.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 2.

State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 17, 136 N.W. 258, 260 (1912) (“To constitute the crime
of rape, the will of the female must have been outraged, and her will must have been forcibly
overcome, and, as I have stated, she must resist to the utmost of her ability, to the utmost
extent of her ability.”).
MINN. STAT. § 6191, subdivs. 1, 4, and 5 (1891) (amended 1967).

70

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

See id.
Id. § 6191, subdiv. 3.
Id.
See id.
Id. §§ 617.01–.02 (repealed 1967).
Id. §§ 609.291–.292 (1967) (repealed 1975).
Compare id. § 609.291 (1967) (repealed 1975), with id. § 6194 (1891) (amended 1967).
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MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

under one of three circumstances. 79 These required circumstances are that:
(1) the victim’s resistance must have been overcome by force, (2) the victim’s
resistance was prevented by a reasonable fear of imminent and great bodily
harm to herself or another, or (3) the victim was physically unconscious,
physically powerless to resist, or incapable of consent because of a mental
illness and that condition was known to the defendant. 80 A conviction for
aggravated rape carried a maximum sentence of thirty years in prison. 81
Where an intoxicant stopped a victim’s resistance to rape, the charge was
relegated to non-aggravated rape. 82 The statute was also expanded to include
situations where the victim was induced to believe the perpetrator was their
husband and where the victim was misled regarding the nature of the acts
committed. 83 Non-aggravated rape was punishable by no more than ten
years in prison. 84
These amendments represented the first instance of gradation of
different degrees of rape. They also represent the first example of the
Legislature determining that one type of rape should be punished more
severely—indeed up to three times more severely—depending on the
circumstances of the assault. 85 Interestingly, in making that distinction, the
Legislature signaled that an assailant who used an intoxicant to “destroy the
victim’s resistance” was somehow less culpable than an assailant who
sexually assaulted a victim while she was unconscious. 86 This early
distinction likely reflected a still-emerging conception of a type of rape that
could occur without consent and without force or coercion. 87

B.

Modern CSC Statutory Scheme

In 1975, the aforementioned rape statutes were repealed entirely
and replaced with the first version of Minnesota’s CSC statutes. 88 Today,
these statutes begin with a definitions section and then proceed to describe

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. § 609.291 (1967) (repealed 1975).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 609.292.
Id.
Id.
See id. §§ 609.291–.292.
Compare id. § 609.291, with id. § 609.292.
Kyla Bishop, A Reflection on the History of Sexual Assault Laws in the United States, ARK.

J.
OF
SOC.
CHANGE
AND
PUB.
SERV.
(Apr.
15,
2018),
https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2018/04/15/reflection-history-sexual-assault-laws-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/EKJ7-W6GC]. The 1960s onward ushered in significant progress in
American rape law as the anti-rape movement emerged as violence against women became
a central point in the second-wave feminist movement. Id.
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341–.345 (1975).
88
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five varying degrees of CSC. 89 These varying degrees of CSC have been
expanded upon substantially through the years 90 but have, to date, missed
the mark as to the criminality of sexual intercourse without consent.

1.

Consent Definition

Minnesota has a strong, accurate, and well-worded definition of
consent. The Legislature has defined consent as “words or overt actions by
a person indicating a freely given present agreement to perform a particular
sexual act with the actor.” 91 Using language strikingly similar to the
Wisconsin definition, 92 Minnesota’s definition allows for the indication of
consent through both words and actions, requires consent be freely given,
and applies only to the current agreement to perform the particular act in
question. 93
This definition fits nicely into the affirmative consent model and
does not require amendment. 94 Indeed, the definitional statute takes further
steps to ensure corroboration of victim testimony is not required to prove
lack of consent, and to define what does not constitute consent: “[c]onsent
does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between
the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a
particular sexual act.” 95 The consent definition also notes that a person who
is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless cannot provide consent. 96
Therefore, Minnesota’s consent definition accurately reflects the affirmative

See id. §§ 609.341–.345 (2019).
The amendments following 1975 focus almost entirely on broadening or narrowing specific
definitions. This is particularly true of the definition of “position of authority,” which will not
be discussed in this paper as consent is not relevant if the defendant was in a position of
authority at the time of the assault.
MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4(a) (2019).
In pertinent part, “‘[c]onsent’, as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a
person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to
have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2020).
MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4 (2019).
Though specifically adding the word “informed” before “consent” as in the Wisconsin
statute would more clearly articulate that Minnesota has intentionally adopted the informed
consent standard, the definition as it stands would suffice if the rest of the CSC framework
were amended.
MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 4(a) (2019).
Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 7 (“[A] person [who], as a result of inadequately developed or
impaired intelligence or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the
judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration.”); id. §
609.341, subdiv. 9 (“[A] person [who] is (a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold
consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or (c) unable to
communicate nonconsent and the condition is known or reasonably should have been
known to the actor.”).
89
90

91
92

93
94

95
96
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consent model, but issues arise from its interplay with the five degrees of
Minnesota’s CSC statutes.

2.

CSC Framework

Minnesota breaks the CSC crimes into five degrees based on the
degree of force or injury a victim sustains and the distinction between sexual
penetration and sexual contact. 97 Interestingly, with the 1975 retooling of
rape law in Minnesota, the Legislature proposed to do away entirely with
the resistance requirement, stating specifically that in prosecution under the
new CSC statutes, “there is no need to show that the victim resisted the
accused.” 98 The change was laudable as an attempt to shift the focus of rape
prosecutions away from the victim’s actions and onto the defendant.
However, in using force, injury, or contact, combined with penetration to
rank offenses, the current Legislature has failed to recognize the specific
criminality of nonconsensual sexual penetration without force, injury or
contact. 99
Fifth-degree CSC represents the base CSC offense and prohibits
nonconsensual sexual contact. 100 Fifth-degree CSC was added to the CSC
statutes in 1988 and represents the only CSC level that does not require
additional elements aside from nonconsensual sexual contact. 101 Fourthdegree CSC adds to nonconsensual contact, the additional element of force
or coercion. 102 Third-degree CSC prohibits sexual penetration by force or
coercion. 103 Second- and first-degree CSC prohibit sexual contact or
penetration, respectively, by force or coercion, resulting in personal injury. 104
As it stands, Minnesota law fails to distinguish nonconsensual
sexual intercourse from nonconsensual sexual contact without force or an
injury. 105 Without some additional element, nonconsensual sexual
intercourse would have to be punished under the same statute as
nonconsensual sexual contact, fifth-degree CSC, which prohibits, among
The distinction between sexual contact and sexual penetration is particularly relevant here.
Sexual contact is defined as intentional touching of a victim’s intimate parts. Id. § 609.341,
subdiv. 11. While sexual penetration includes sexual intercourse or other acts where the
intrusion, however slight, of a body part or object into the genital or anal openings. Id. §
609.341, subdiv. 12. Sexual contact and sexual penetration are both considered sexual
conduct under Minnesota law.
Id. § 609.347, subdiv. 2 (1975).
See id. §§ 609.342–.3451 (2019) (equating unconsented touching with penetration under
Minnesota’s statutory scheme).
Id. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1(1).
Id. § 609.3451.
Id. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (2019).
Id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c).
Id. § 609.343, subdiv. 1(e)(i); Id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e)(i).
See id. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1.
97

98
99

100
101
102
103
104
105
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other things, nonconsensual touching of a victim’s inner thigh over
clothing. 106 Perhaps because of the lack of a specific statute criminalizing
nonconsensual sexual intercourse, Minnesota case law has so broadly
defined force and injury that the terms almost lack real meaning. 107
Both sexual contact and intercourse, like any crime committed by
one person against another, undoubtedly require some amount of force to
execute. The force required to complete sexual intercourse is defined as
intrinsic force; thus, any force “above and beyond” that required to
complete sexual intercourse is defined as extrinsic force. 108 Since force in
this context is used as an enhancement, one might assume extrinsic force,
which is necessary to complete the act, would be required. However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has essentially adopted an intrinsic force
standard for the element of force in the CSC statutes. In Matter of Welfare
of D.L.K., a fourteen-year-old came up behind a classmate, tapped her on
the shoulder and grabbed and pinched her breast. 109 The only force used in
the assault was the pinching itself. 110 However, the Court held that the
defendant’s “sudden and painful grabbing and pinching of the victim's breast
[was] sufficient use of force” to sustain a fourth-degree CSC conviction. 111
Therefore, even the intrinsic force required to complete a sexual act may
be considered enough to meet the required force element in Minnesota’s
CSC statutes.
Similarly, the level of injury required to meet the injury
enhancement is quite low. The statute defines personal injury as “bodily
harm [including physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition], or severe mental anguish or pregnancy.” 112 Thus if a
victim testifies they felt even a “minimal amount of physical pain or injury,”
the element is satisfied. 113 Moreover, the injury “need not necessarily be
coincidental with actual sexual penetration, they need only be sufficiently
related to the act to constitute ‘personal injury’” as defined in section
609.314 of the Minnesota Statutes. 114 Consequently, evidence that a victim
Compare id., with id. § 609.344 (illustrating that sexual penetration is only punished more
severely when accompanied by force, coercion or perpetrated against a minor, an impaired
individual, or where specific trustee relationships exist).
In practice, bodily harm in the form of vaginal redness and soreness from the surprise
sexual contact suffices to show force. State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Minn.
1983). Coercion exists where a defendant creates subjective fear by telling a victim to “shut
up” while holding the victim down and pushing the victim’s dress up. State v. Meech, 400
N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.3(a) (3d ed. 2017).
In re Welfare of D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Minn. 1986).
106

107

108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id. at 438.

MINN. STAT. § 609.431, subdiv. 8 (2019) (referencing id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7 (2019)).
State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003).
State v. Sollman, 402 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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felt even a minimum amount of pain or sustained injuries only minimally
related to the assault is sufficient for the injury enhancement.
These relatively low standards for force and injury are likely a
response to the fact that Minnesota law requires additional elements to
properly distinguish nonconsensual intercourse from nonconsensual
contact. 115 The lack of a clear statute likely led the courts to these low
standards; however, these decisions have left us with a strange situation
where almost all CSC statutes overlap significantly. 116 As one commentator
noted, because of these low thresholds:
[t]he personal injury element will be satisfied in every case
involving a nonconsensual sexual act. Nonconsensual
sexual acts necessarily involve pain or mental anguish,
either of which can constitute bodily harm. The only
difference between third- and first-degree CSC is the
addition of the aggravating element of personal injury. The
same is true of fourth- and second-degree CSC. Because
the injury element will be satisfied in every case, by proving
third-degree CSC, the state can necessarily prove firstdegree CSC and likewise, by proving fourth-degree CSC,
the state can necessarily prove second-degree CSC. 117
While the low thresholds have certainly made the CSC statutes workable
for the last few decades, it is time to reform the statutes to make a clear,
workable statutory scheme that does not require loose definitions and
overlapping factors to function.

3.

Physically Helpless

Another workaround to Minnesota’s lack of a strong,
nonconsensual sexual intercourse statute has been the use of third-degree
CSC, where a defendant knows the victim is physically helpless. 118 This
provision has been used when a victim is voluntarily extremely intoxicated
and cannot consent to sexual conduct. 119 An earlier version of the definition
of physically helpless defined the term as, among other things, when a victim
was “unable to withhold consent or to withdraw because of a physical
See MINN. STAT. § 609.3451.
Compare id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e)(i), with id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c) (illustrating the de
minimus nature of an injury necessary to show first-degree sexual assault, rendering third115
116

degree assault practically redundant).
Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Minnesota’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Statutes: A Call for Change,
39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1623, 1632 (2013).
MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(d).
See e.g., State v. Berrios, 788 N.W.2d 135, 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Owen,
No. A18-0318, 2018 WL 6273120, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2018); State v. Wille, No.
A16-1710, 2017 WL 3585108, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2017).
117

118
119
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condition.” 120 Thus, if a victim was so intoxicated they could not withdraw
from the situation, a jury could find the defendant guilty of felony thirddegree CSC. 121 This was until 1994 when the Minnesota Legislature inserted
a single word into the definition: “consent.” 122
In State v. Blevins, the Minnesota Court of Appeals explained the
result of the Legislature’s addition of the word “consent” into the physically
helpless definition. 123 In Blevins, the victim voluntarily consumed ten to
twelve alcoholic beverages and became intoxicated. 124 Blevins, the
defendant, approached the victim and told her he would help her find her
car. 125 Instead, Blevins took the victim to the back porch of a house and
downstairs to a crawl space under the porch. 126 There, Blevins made sexual
advances and eventually engaged in oral and vaginal intercourse with the
victim. 127 The victim testified “she felt stuck, uncomfortable, and afraid, she
‘just let it happen’ and ‘waited for it to be over.’” 128 Blevins was charged with
and convicted of third-degree CSC, sexual penetration of a physically
helpless victim, and challenged the sufficiency of evidence for his
conviction. 129
In an earlier case, State v. Griffith, 130 the same court was presented
with very similar facts and sustained the conviction because the victim in
Griffith “felt helpless to stop the attack,” and the complainant's
“‘helplessness’ was due to her ‘physical condition,’” Griffith’s conviction was
upheld. 131 In Griffith, physically helpless was defined as “unable to withhold
consent or to withdraw because of a physical condition,” 132 and “withdraw”
was interpreted as referring to the physical ability to withdraw from the
attack. 133 Because the victim’s extreme intoxication made her unable to
physically withdraw from the assault, the court upheld the conviction. 134
MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (1982) (amended 1994).
See State v. Griffith, 480 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding defendant’s
conviction where victim was too drunk to leave the situation), superseded by statute, MINN.
STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9(b) (1994), as recognized in State v. Cobb, No. A14-0422, 2015
WL 853421, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015).
MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (1994).
State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 699.
120
121

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700–01.

480 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).

Id. at 350.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 351.
Id. (upholding a conviction whereby the victim passed out and remained unconscious

during most of the assault).
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However, in Blevins, the court noted the Legislature amended the
physically helpless statute, which now reads “unable to withhold consent or
to withdraw consent because of a physical condition.” 135 The State now had
to prove the victim was unable to withhold or withdraw consent, rather than
simply being unable to withdraw physically. 136 Because the victim was able
to verbalize her lack of consent, and indeed repeatedly verbalized her lack
of consent before and during the assault, the court found she was not
physically helpless as defined by the newly amended statute, and the
defendant’s conviction was reversed. 137
Under this holding, the level of intoxication necessary for a victim
to be physically helpless, and thus unable to consent to sexual conduct, is
exorbitantly high. 138 Indeed, the 1994 amendment had the effect of
comingling two of the three-pronged definition of physically helpless. 139
Physically helpless is defined as “(a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to
withhold consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or
(c) unable to communicate nonconsent.” 140 In the Blevins holding, what
difference is there between a victim being (b) unable to withhold or withdraw
consent because of a physical condition and (c) unable to communicate
nonconsent? 141 The Minnesota Legislature must act to set a reasonable
standard for when a person is too intoxicated to consent to sexual conduct.
It can do so by codifying a definition of affirmative consent.
III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
While Minnesota’s statutory definition of consent largely comports
with other definitions of affirmative consent, it is important to understand
the standard and how it should be adopted into Minnesota’s broader CSC
statutes. Affirmative consent standards have been adopted by the vast
majority of higher education institutions and have worked well in Wisconsin
for many years. 142

135
136
137
138

State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added).

Id. at 701.
Id.
See id. (inferring that the level of intoxication must be elevated to the point of preventing

speech).
MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (1994).
Id. § 609.341, subdiv. 9 (2019).
See id.
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 442 (2016)
(“An estimated 1,400 institutions of higher education have adopted disciplinary standards
that codify an affirmative definition of sexual consent.”); see also, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.225(4) (West 2020) (defining “consent” as meaning “words or overt actions by a person
who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact”).

139
140
141
142
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Defining Affirmative Consent

Affirmative consent is generally defined as “a rebuttable
presumption of nonconsent, which would be overcome by any affirmative
expression of desire for sex.” 143 A participant must be legally able to give
consent, meaning they are of age and in an appropriate mental state. 144 The
consent must be freely given and not made based on a threat or perceived
threat to the participant or another. 145 Finally, the consent must be to the
present sexual encounter—one cannot assume that consent was given based
on a prior sexual relationship. 146 While these elements may seem overly
rigid, affirmative consent is a relatively flexible standard, which comports
with modern concepts of consent and sexuality, and has worked as an
effective standard in Wisconsin.

1.

“Yes Means Yes”

Affirmative consent may be best known by the “Yes Means Yes”
catchphrase. 147 However, the phrase itself is more of a response to the “No
Means No” campaign, as proponents realized the ineffectiveness of that
campaign. 148 “No Means No” was originally designed to highlight that when
a person says “no” to sexual conduct, they mean it. 149 However, “No Means
No” misses the important point that there are more ways to decline sexual
conduct than by saying no, and that a person is responsible for interpreting
nonverbal signals and cues as well as listening to verbal ones. 150 More
143

David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 317, 400 (2000).

See MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(f) (defining Minnesota’s graduated age of consent,
which adjusts with the age of the perpetrator).
See id. § 609.345, subdiv. 1(c) (prohibiting the use of force or coercion in obtaining
consent).
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 2020); see also State v. Anchico, No. 87-1414,
1988 WL 112263, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988) (holding that evidence of a prior
consensual sexual relationship was neither material nor relevant to consent as to the alleged
nonconsensual encounter).
See JACLYN FRIEDMAN & JESSICA VALENTI, YES MEANS YES!: VISIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL
POWER AND A WORLD WITHOUT RAPE (2008) (Friedman’s 2008 book popularized the
phrase).
Megan Garber, The Dangerous Insufficiency of ‘No Means No’, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 1,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/08/the-dangerousinsufficiency-of-no-means-no/566465/ [https://perma.cc/C8ZQ-YZDL].
See Karen Lehrman, When ‘No’ Means ‘No’, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/09/books/when-no-means-no.html,
[https://perma.cc/3GPV-6MSV].
See Garber, supra note 148 (“[E]ven Harvey Weinstein . . . understood the basic sanctity
of no means no. His method, it seems, was simply to try everything he could to greasily
manipulate the no into a yes: ignoring the no, effectively, while . . . abiding by the wishes of
the woman.”).
144

145
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149

150
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importantly, “Yes Means Yes” represents the idea that consent is an
affirmative action and not the lack of declination to act. 151 “Yes Means Yes”
stands for the proposition that consent standards should look for an
affirmative agreement to sexual conduct, rather than assuming that the lack
of a “no” means the party consented.
The “Yes Means Yes” standard has especially gained popularity on
college campuses as schools define sexual assault and consent for Title IX
purposes, 152 though the precise language of the standard varies. More than
800 colleges and universities have adopted the standard in one way or
another. 153 The University of St. Thomas, for example, expounds a “Yes
Means Yes” standard; however, even the language of this policy indicates
nonverbal conduct may also be construed as affirmative consent. 154 Mitchell
Hamline School of Law similarly defines consent, 155 as does the University
of Minnesota. 156 Under these definitions, affirmative consent does not
literally mean that “yes means yes.” Parties are not required under the
affirmative consent doctrine to literally ask for verbal reassurance that their
partner is affirmatively consenting to sexual relations. These policies
illustrate that a clear indication of free agreement, through conduct or
words, to engage in the sexual act is all that is required.
These policy statements also include another important portion of
the affirmative consent doctrine, that “[c]onsent to one form of sexual
activity does not imply consent to other forms of sexual activity.” 157 Thus,
affirmative consent to one act is not affirmative consent to another.
Affirmative consent must occur before any sexual activity escalates.
While other definitions of affirmative consent exist in the Title IX
realm, affirmative consent is simply the requirement that, just like in
See id. (noting affirmative consent represents “active affirmation, rather than passive
acquiescence, that feminists have fought for.”).
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C § 1681 (addressing sex-based discrimination
against students or employees at federally funded educational institutions).
The NCHERM Group, LLC, The NCHERM Group Continues to Advocate for
Affirmative Consent Policies in Colleges and Schools Across the Nation, CISION PR
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-ncherm-groupcontinues-to-advocate-for-affirmative-consent-policies-in-colleges-and-schools-across-thenation-278778841.html [https://perma.cc/HQR4-FBC7].
UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS, Consent, in SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY § IV(A)(2)(c), 7–8
(Aug.
14,
2020),
https://www.stthomas.edu/title-ix/sexualmisconduct/
[https://perma.cc/3S44-5KYZ].
MITCHELL HAMLINE SCH. OF L., Consent, in SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY FOR
STUDENTS § III(V) (2020), https://mitchellhamline.edu/catalog/sexual-misconduct-policyfor-students/ [https://perma.cc/VE59-7F4Y].
UNIV. OF MINN., Definitions: Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT, SEXUAL ASSAULT,
STALKING AND RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE POLICY STATEMENT 23 (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://policy.umn.edu/operations/sexualassault [https://perma.cc/6R78-Z237].
UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS, supra note 154, at 8.
151

152

153

154
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contracts, medical procedures, or any other potentially life-altering
agreement, both parties knowingly agree to the action to be taken. 158 As
comedian John Oliver put it, “sex is like boxing, if one of the parties didn’t
agree to participate, the other one is committing a crime.” 159 The form the
affirmative consent takes, whether verbal or nonverbal, does not matter so
much as the fact that all parties' affirmatively consent. Whether the boxers
sign a form saying they consent to the match, verbally agree just before
bumping gloves, or exert overt and clear actions indicating their present
willingness to spar, affirmative consent is the standard required. 160

B.

Affirmative Consent in Action

Minnesota should strive to emulate Wisconsin’s affirmative consent
sexual assault statutes. Adopting a statutory scheme similar to that of
Wisconsin would give teeth to Minnesota’s consent definition and allow
prosecution of rape regardless of how the victim reacted to it. 161 Wisconsin
divides sexual assaults into four levels, with additional factors aggravating
nonconsensual contact up to a class B felony, punishable by a maximum of
60 years in prison. 162
On the lowest end of the spectrum, Wisconsin defines fourthdegree sexual assault simply as “sexual contact with a person without the
consent of that person,” 163 so long as that contact does not involve additional
aggravating factors. 164 This statute mirrors Minnesota’s fifth-degree CSC, as
See, e.g., Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701 (Minn. 1977) (noting that doctors
must disclose information that a reasonable patient would find material to treatment to
illustrate consent); State v. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
U.S. v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1984)) (holding that under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, “[m]isrepresentation used to obtain consent to a search will invalidate the
consent”); Carpenter v. Vreeman, 409 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 164(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981)) (“A contract is voidable
if a party's assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the
other party . . . .”).
LastWeekTonight, Sex Education: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO),
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
9,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0jQz6jqQS0
[https://perma.cc/5ZXX-CT3S].
State v. Peek, A04-1535, 2005 WL 2495773, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2005) (“[I]t
does not follow that where consent is present, such as in the ‘mutual combat’ situation posited
by Peek, that consent is a defense to assault.”).
See Hennepin Attorney, supra note 30.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3)(b) (West 2020).
Id. § 940.225(3m).
Id. at (5)(b)(2) (intentional ejaculation or emission of urine or feces by defendant upon any
part of complainant’s body, clothed or unclothed); Id. at (5)(b)(3) (“For the purpose of
sexually degrading or humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the
defendant, intentionally causing the complainant to ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any
part of the defendant's body, whether clothed or unclothed.”).
158

159

160

161
162
163
164
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it criminalizes nonconsensual sexual contact, though fifth-degree CSC is
punishable by not more than one-year imprisonment, 165 while Wisconsin’s
fourth-degree sexual assault is punishable by no more than nine months
imprisonment. 166
Importantly, the next step up in Wisconsin’s sexual assault statutory
scheme proscribes “sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of
that person.” 167 In conjunction with Wisconsin’s consent definition, this
statute is the key element missing from Minnesota’s CSC statutory scheme.
It simply makes sexual intercourse without consent illegal—full stop. 168 There
is no force, injury, coercion, position of authority, or special victim
requirement. 169 Importantly, it also makes nonconsensual sexual intercourse
a felony, punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years. 170 The adoption
of similar language and similar punishment will move Minnesota’s CSC
statutory scheme out of the grasp of flawed common law doctrines and into
an era where sexual intercourse requires affirmative consent. Anything less
than full adoption of this standard will allow Minnesota’s CSC laws to
continue to miss the criminality of nonconsensual sexual intercourse.
Wisconsin has two degrees of aggravated sexual assault. Seconddegree sexual assault builds on the fourth- and third-degree statutes
proscribing sexual contact or intercourse with another person without their
consent and adds an additional element of a threat of force or violence or
personal injury. 171 First-degree sexual assault is reserved for when the assault
results in great bodily harm or pregnancy, or when the defendant uses or
threatens to use a dangerous weapon to complete the assault. 172 Rather than
requiring low threshold definitions of force or injury, Wisconsin simply
ranks sexual assaults based on the use of threats, minor or major injury, or
the use or threat of a dangerous weapon. 173 Not only does this statutory
scheme simplify sexual assaults compared to Minnesota’s CSC statutes, the
straightforward definitions and use of affirmative consent accurately reflects
the criminality of sexual contact or intercourse without consent.
In addition, Wisconsin’s second-degree sexual assault statute
includes intercourse with sexual contact or intercourse with “a person who
is under the influence of an intoxicant to a degree which renders that person
incapable of giving consent,” so long as the defendant has knowledge of the
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

MINN. STAT. § 609.3451, subdiv. 2 (2019).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.51(3)(a) (West 2020).
Id. § 940.225(3)(a).

Id.
Id.
Id. § 939.50(3)(g).
Id. § 940.225(2)(a)–(b).
Id. § 940.225(1)(a)–(b).
Id. § 940.225.
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person’s condition and acts intentionally. 174 This definition solves the
problem of Blevins discussed in Part II. Minnesota’s statutory scheme only
directly accounts for involuntary intoxication of a victim without the
knowledge of that person, 175 and thus misses a large swath of cases where the
victim became intoxicated voluntarily. 176 Prosecutors attempted to solve that
problem using the physically helpless statute until the Blevins decision
eliminated that possibility. 177 However, Wisconsin’s straightforward
prohibition in the heightened second-degree sexual assault statute of
intercourse or contact with anyone who is so intoxicated that they cannot
consent solves that problem. Adopting just this subdivision would allow
prosecutors to adequately charge the sexual assaults of victims who are too
intoxicated to consent without jumping through the many hoops and pitfalls
of the Minnesota statutes.
Wisconsin’s actual definition of consent does not differ greatly from
the Minnesota definition. Just as in Minnesota, consent under Wisconsin’s
definition “requires an affirmative indication of willingness. A failure to say
no or to resist does not constitute consent in fact.” 178 What makes
Wisconsin’s statutory scheme so effective is its simplistic use of that
definition in criminalizing nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse
without the addition of other factors. Force especially is a remnant of
outdated resistance requirements from common law notions of rape. 179
Force and injury definitions have become so convoluted through attempts
to bring the CSC statutes in line with the real world that they are almost
meaningless. The way forward is to completely abandon the five degrees of
the current statutory scheme and instead adopt a system based on
Wisconsin’s sexual assault laws.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT AND THEIR
COUNTERARGUMENTS
While Minnesota’s consent definition by itself accurately reflects
the definition of affirmative consent, arguments may still be made that the
174

Id. § 940.225(2)(cm).

MINN. STAT. § 609.341, subdiv. 7 (2019) (“‘Mentally incapacitated’ means that a person
under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered
to that person without the person’s agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent
to sexual contact or sexual penetration.”).
See, e.g., Stahl et al., When Rape Is Reported, supra note 9; Stahl et al., How Alcohol
Foils Rape Investigations, supra note 17; No charges in University of Minnesota wrestling
sexual assault investigation, supra note 26; Hennepin Attorney, supra note 30.
State v. Blevins, 757 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); see, e.g., State v. Griffith, 480
N.W.2d 347, 349–50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶ 31, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 107, 765 N.W.2d 557, 565.
See Edwards, supra note 48, at 245. (“[U]nder the common law, the prosecution had to
prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: carnal knowledge, force, and lack of
consent.”).
175

176

177

178
179
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current statutory scheme’s ultimate denial of affirmative consent in practice
is a desirable result. These arguments are addressed in turn, and their
counterarguments are given in the hopes of guiding debate.

A.

Affirmative Consent Shifts the Burden of Proof

The initial argument against the use of affirmative consent in rape
statutes is that affirmative consent shifts the burden of proof from the State
to the defendant. However, this is not the case in Wisconsin and will not be
the case in Minnesota if the Legislature adopts substantially similar language.
In State v. Grunke, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin’s sexual assault statutes' plain language established that lack of
consent was an element of the offense that needed to be affirmatively proven
by the State. 180 “In order to achieve a conviction for third-degree sexual
assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3), the State must still prove the element
‘without consent’ beyond a reasonable doubt.” 181 The prosecution does not
need to prove that the victim actively withheld consent; instead, it must
prove that no affirmative consent was made. 182 This burden is entirely on the
State, and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 183
While proving a negative can be difficult, it is not impossible and
does not shift the burden onto a defendant to prove affirmative consent was
given. Of course, the defendant is free to prove consent was given, which
would bring into doubt the State’s case, but the defendant is not required to
prove anything. Simply put, Wisconsin’s requirement that “without
consent” be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of its sexual
assault statutes does not shift the burden onto defendants.

B.

Affirmative Consent Ruins Sexual Intimacy

Other commentators have complained that affirmative consent
ruins traditional notions of sexual intimacy. 184 To some extent, this may be
180
181
182

State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶ 28, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769.

Id. at ¶ 25.
See id. at ¶ 28 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2020)) (“The element ‘without

consent’ in subsection (3) requires no affirmative act, such as the withholding of consent, on
the part of the victim. Rather, the State must prove that there was no affirmative consent.
Stated otherwise, the plain language of subsection (3) requires the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendants attempted to have sexual intercourse with the victim
without her ‘words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse.’ Wis. Stat. § 940.225(4). The State does not have to prove that the victim
withheld consent.”) (alteration in original).

Id.
See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search
for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 1009 (2008) (“But the greatest weakness

183
184

of the policy was perhaps in its requirement that there be consent each and every time there
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true. Affirmative consent runs counter to traditional, common law notions
surrounding consent and sexual activity. 185 Affirmative consent could not
function during the late 1800s when by law, wives could not be raped by
their husbands, and victims were required to resist “to the utmost” in order
to convey their lack of consent. 186 However, much has changed since then.
The right to vote has been universally extended to everyone of age, and
substantial steps have been taken to ensure equal treatment under the law. 187
Indeed, as noted above, even certain James Bond scenes that were socially
acceptable in the mid-sixties are reprehensible now. It makes sense that legal
norms surrounding consent and sexual activity should also adjust to reflect
equal treatment under the law.
Moreover, affirmative consent makes room for seduction and
allows for consenting persons to change their minds. “Seduction is not
rape,” 188 and that is still true under the affirmative consent standard. An
initial lack of affirmative consent, even an initial “no,” is evidence that could
easily be overcome by other evidence of affirmative consent closer to the
act in question. 189 Even if a person initially plays “hard to get,” there should
certainly be evidence that they gave affirmative consent before the act. 190 A
finding beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously determined by twelve
uninvolved peers, is a high burden. If a defendant was successful in their
seduction and acquired affirmative consent, the odds of acquittal are very
high if the case is even charged and survives motions for dismissal in the
first place. Affirmative consent makes room for seduction and destroys
traditional sexual norms that are worth leaving behind. 191

is sexual activity. If the couple were living together and had relations every night upon
undressing and going onto the bed, under the policy there must still be the series of verbal
consents before any new level (whatever precisely that may be) is reached.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of
an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1359 (2005).
See MINN. STAT. § 6191 (1891); State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 17, 136 N.W. 258, 260
(1912).
See generally e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Klein, supra note 184, at 1012.
Little, supra note 185, at 1348.
See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No
185
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When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to
Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 872, 874 (1988) (discussing statistics about women
initially saying no to sexual intercourse although they intended to say yes).
See Little, supra note 185, at 1359.
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Some may argue that adopting an affirmative consent standard may
lead to a surge of false rape claims. 192 This argument begins with the incorrect
premise that false reporting is rampant in rape cases. 193 While it is difficult
to estimate how many rape complaints are “false,” given the general
underreporting of sexual assaults and difficulty in determining whether a
claim was knowingly false or if an investigation simply did not find enough
evidence to submit charges, studies have found that the incident of false
reports is between two and ten percent. 194 This percentage is roughly on par
with the number of false accusations with other felonies. 195
Additionally, even with the affirmative consent standard, sexual
assault crimes would still be subject to the same procedural checks they are
today. Police will still investigate allegations to determine if there is enough
evidence to submit to prosecutors. 196 Prosecutors will provide an
independent review of that evidence and determine if there is probable
cause to believe a crime occurred and determine if it can reasonably be
proven to a jury. 197 The judicial branch provides an additional check,
reviewing cases—even after conviction—to determine if sufficient evidence
existed to support the conviction. If anything, the adoption of affirmative
consent will focus investigation of rape allegations on what is important: what
evidence exists suggesting a lack of affirmative consent? Finally, prosecutors
192

See id. at 1357.

Cameron Kimble, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN CTR.
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/sexualassault-remains-dramatically-underreported [https://perma.cc/6DCH-NMYR] (“[N]early 80
percent of rapes and sexual assaults go unreported, according to a Justice Department
analysis of violent crime in 2016”) (emphasis added).
Melanie Heenan & Suellen Murray, Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000-2003:
Summary Research Report, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. (2006) (finding 2.1
percent of 812 reports of sexual assault to be false); David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sarah C.
Nicksa & Ashley M. Cote, False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of
Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329 (2010) (describing how 5.9
percent of the 136 Boston cases of sexual assault found to be false); Kimberly A. Lonsway,
Joanne Archambault & David Lisak, False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to Successfully
Investigate and Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assault, 43 PROSECUTOR, J. OF THE NAT’L
DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N (2009) (describing how 140 (7 percent) of the 2,059 sexual assault
reports across eight U.S. communities were found to be false).
Little, supra note 185, at 1357 (“[F]alse accusations of rape are no more prevalent than
false accusations of other types of major crime.”).
Lonsway et al., supra note 194, at 15 (“[I]nvestigators and prosecutors must base all final
judgments of a sexual assault report on the findings from a thorough, evidence-based
investigation.”).
See Little, supra note 185, at 1357–58 (“Prosecutors act as an effective screening
mechanism here as well—given the difficulty of convicting a rapist, they tend only to prosecute
the clearest cut cases, where the chances of conviction are greatest.”).
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and defense attorneys will still require that victims testify under oath. 198 The
Confrontation Clause will allow the defendant to cross-examine the victim
to determine if the report was indeed false. 199 While some false reporting
may still occur, the adoption of an affirmative consent standard is unlikely
to increase the number of these occurrences.

D. Affirmative Consent Does Not Solve the Voluntarily Intoxication
Problem
The final argument against affirmative consent is that it does not
solve the problem of determining consent through the ambiguity of sexual
signaling—especially when both parties are voluntarily intoxicated. 200 On the
one hand, adoption of a standard similar to Wisconsin’s prohibition of
sexual activity with “a person who is under the influence of an intoxicant to
a degree which renders that person incapable of giving consent” 201 would at
least make for a more exact standard than Minnesota’s current statutes.
However, determining when a person is so intoxicated that they are
incapable of consent remains difficult. Sexual signaling is ambiguous—an act
or word may mean one thing to one person and something entirely different
to another. Even a “no” spoken sarcastically to a person with a strong
understanding of the speaker may be accurately interpreted to mean “yes.” 202
Affirmative consent does not solve this problem, but it does mark
a step in the right direction. 203 Minnesota’s current statutory scheme of
watered-down definitions of force and injury and overlapping enhancement
elements only compounds that problem for juries—not only must they
determine what the actors meant, they also have to figure out what the
statutes mean, which is less than ideal. Adopting a simpler standard, such as
that from Wisconsin, will allow juries to focus on the conduct at trial and
not the difficult to understand statutory language. Certainly, no statutory
language is perfect, but adopting language similar to Wisconsin’s is a step in
the right direction.

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004) (prohibiting out of court testimony
from witness available at trial).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Conundrum of Voluntary Intoxication and Sex, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 1031, 1048–49 (2017).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2)(cm) (West 2020).
Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 190, at 874.
Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 200, at 1048 (“[T]he affirmative consent standard
transforms the legal meaning of passivity.”).
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V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Given the above discussion, Minnesota should take several steps to
bring its CSC statutes in line with affirmative consent. Minnesota can do this
by taking model language from Wisconsin and adopting that language into
four degrees of sexual assault.
The most important step the Legislature should take is removing
the force or injury requirements from third-degree and fourth-degree
CSC. 204 This removal would criminalize sexual penetration and sexual
contact when a defendant fails to obtain affirmative consent, regardless of
the surrounding circumstances. Nonconsensual sexual contact or
penetration is the action that should be criminalized, without regard to force
or injury.
Aggravating factors of threats or injuries should be used to enhance
either sexual contact or sexual penetration to second-degree sexual assault. 205
Both sexual contact and sexual penetration are treated similarly in this
instance because the true level of criminality comes from the threat of injury
in combination with the assault without affirmative consent. Additional
aggravating factors of great bodily harm or use of a dangerous weapon
should likewise elevate the crime to first-degree sexual assault. 206 Again, the
level of criminality comes from the degree of injury or use of a weapon in
combination with the assault.
Additionally, Minnesota can preserve its graduated punishments by
adopting Wisconsin’s third-and fourth-degree assault statutes. 207 Fourthdegree sexual assault, like fifth-degree CSC, punishes nonconsensual sexual
contact as a gross misdemeanor unless aggravating factors are present. 208
This sole use of a gross misdemeanor sentence reflects the reality that sexual
contact without affirmative consent—while reprehensible—does not rise to
the same level as sexual intercourse without affirmative consent. This
standard was adopted by the Minnesota Legislature when it ratified fifthdegree CSC and should remain in place with the new amendments. 209
Finally, Minnesota’s current statutory scheme includes special
relationship statutes, which identify specific trustee relationships that

204
205

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2020).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(e) (2019) (aggravating rape to first degree where

a personal injury was inflicted through the use of force).
See, e.g., id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(d) (2019) (aggravating rape to first degree where the
perpetrator was armed).
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3)–(3m) (West 2020).
Id. § 940.225(3m).
See MINN. STAT. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1 (2019).
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preclude a victim from furnishing voluntary or meaningful consent. 210 These
relationship statutes have been the focus of most of the post-1975
amendments to Minnesota’s CSC statutes and have been retained in the
proposed second-degree assault provisions. 211 These well-defined and highly
specific special relationships have been of great concern to the Legislature
in recent history and should be retained.
Making these changes to Minnesota’s CSC statutes will allow
prosecutors to punish nonconsensual sexual contact and sexual intercourse
as the crimes they are. These statutes do not rely on watered-down judicial
definitions of force and injury, nor do they create insurmountable hurdles
in the prosecution of voluntarily intoxicated victim cases. The amendments
strike an appropriate balance between proscribing criminality and clearly
delineating what that criminality consists of. Minnesota should move quickly
to make these changes and adopt a fully affirmative consent standard for its
sexual assault statutes.
VI. MODEL LANGUAGE
1) First degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty
of a felony, punishable by no more than 30 years.
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person
without consent of that person and causes pregnancy or great bodily harm
to that person.
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person
without consent of that person by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon
or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably
to believe it to be a dangerous weapon.
(c) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual
contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that
person by use or threat of force or violence.
(2) Second degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is
guilty of a felony punishable by 25 years, except that violation of subdivision
(g), (h), and (i) are punishable by 15 years:
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person
without consent of that person by use or threat of force or violence.

See, e.g., id. § 609.345, subdivs. 1(i), (l)–(m), (o)–(p) (2019) (prohibiting psychotherapists,
clergy members, correctional officers, massage therapists, and police officers from engaging
in sexual relations with their wards with whom they deal professionally).
See, e.g., Act of Aug. 10, 2010, ch. 270, § 3, 2010 Minn. Laws 1, 4 (clarifying penal
custodial relationships); Act of May 7, 2007, ch. 54, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 1, 31 (prohibiting
sex with massage therapists); Act of May 17, 2002, ch. 381, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 1311, 1313
(prohibiting sex with special transportation providers).
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(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person
without consent of that person and causes injury, illness, disease or
impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ, or mental anguish
requiring psychiatric care for the victim.
(c) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person
(i) who suffers from a mental illness or deficiency which
renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable
of appraising the person's conduct, and the defendant
knows of such condition, or;
(ii) who is under the influence of an intoxicant to a degree
which renders that person incapable of giving consent if the
defendant has actual knowledge that the person is
incapable of giving consent and the defendant has the
purpose to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with
the person while the person is incapable of giving consent.
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the
defendant knows is unconscious.
(f) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual
contact or sexual intercourse with another person without the
consent of that person.
(g) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person and
(1) has a significant relationship with that person, or
(2) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a
patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual penetration
occurred:
(i) during the psychotherapy session; or
(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing
psychotherapist-patient
relationship
exists.
Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(3) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a
former patient of the psychotherapist and the former
patient is emotionally dependent upon the
psychotherapist;
(4) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a
patient or former patient and the sexual penetration
occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by
the complainant is not a defense;
(5) the actor accomplishes the sexual penetration by means
of deception or false representation that the penetration is
for a bona fide medical purpose. Consent by the
complainant is not a defense;
(6) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy,
the complainant is not married to the actor, and:
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(i) the sexual penetration occurred during the
course of a meeting in which the complainant
sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid,
or comfort from the actor in private; or
(ii) the sexual penetration occurred during a
period of time in which the complainant was
meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek
or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or
comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is
not a defense;
(7) the actor is an employee, independent contractor, or
volunteer of a state, county, city, or privately operated adult
or juvenile correctional system, or secure treatment facility,
or treatment facility providing services to clients civilly
committed as mentally ill and dangerous, sexually
dangerous persons, or sexual psychopathic personalities,
including, but not limited to, jails, prisons, detention
centers, or work release facilities, and the complainant is a
resident of a facility or under supervision of the
correctional system. Consent by the complainant is not a
defense;
(8) the actor provides or is an agent of an entity that
provides special transportation service, the complainant
used the special transportation service, and the sexual
penetration occurred during or immediately before or after
the actor transported the complainant. Consent by the
complainant is not a defense;
(9) the actor performs massage or other bodywork for hire,
the complainant was a user of one of those services, and
nonconsensual sexual penetration occurred during or
immediately before or after the actor performed or was
hired to perform one of those services for the complainant;
or
(10) the actor is a peace officer, as defined in section
626.84, and the officer physically or constructively restrains
the complainant, or the complainant does not reasonably
feel free to leave the officer's presence. Consent by the
complainant is not a defense. This paragraph does not
apply to any penetration of the mouth, genitals, or anus
during a lawful search.
(h) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an individual who
is confined in a correctional institution if the actor is a correctional
staff member. This paragraph does not apply if the individual with
whom the actor has sexual contact or sexual intercourse is subject
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to prosecution for the sexual contact or sexual intercourse under
this section.
(i) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an individual who
is on probation, parole, or extended supervision if the actor is a
probation, parole, or extended supervision agent who supervises
the individual, either directly or through a subordinate, in his or her
capacity as a probation, parole, or extended supervision agent or
who has influenced or has attempted to influence another
probation, parole, or extended supervision agent's supervision of
the individual. This paragraph does not apply if the individual with
whom the actor has sexual contact or sexual intercourse is subject
to prosecution for the sexual contact or sexual intercourse under
this section.
(3) Third degree sexual assault.
(a) Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person without the
consent of that person is guilty of a felony punishable by no more
than 10 years.
(b) Whoever has sexual contact with a person in either of the
following manners is guilty of a felony punishable by 15 years:
(i) Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or intentional
emission of urine or feces by the defendant or, upon the
defendant's instruction, by another person upon any part
of the body clothed or unclothed of the complainant if that
ejaculation or emission is either for the purpose of sexually
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or for
the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant
(ii) For the purpose of sexually degrading or humiliating
the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the
defendant, intentionally causing the complainant to
ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any part of the
defendant's body, whether clothed or unclothed.
(4) Fourth degree sexual assault. Except as provided in sub. (3)(b), whoever
has sexual contact with a person without the consent of that person is guilty
of a gross misdemeanor.
(4) Consent. “Consent", as used in this section, means words or overt
actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a
freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. Consent
does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between
the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a
particular sexual act. Consent is not an issue in alleged violations of sub. (2)
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(c), (d), (g), (h), and (i). The following persons are presumed incapable of
consent but the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence,
(a) A person suffering from a mental illness or defect which impairs
capacity to appraise personal conduct.
(b) A person who is unconscious or for any other reason is
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.

Mitchell Hamline Law Review
The Mitchell Hamline Law Review is a student-edited journal. Founded in 1974, the Law
Review publishes timely articles of regional, national and international interest for legal
practitioners, scholars, and lawmakers. Judges throughout the United States regularly
cite the Law Review in their opinions. Academic journals, textbooks, and treatises
frequently cite the Law Review as well. It can be found in nearly all U.S. law school
libraries and online.
mitchellhamline.edu/lawreview

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

